Yesterday I speculated on the need for unifying figures in revolutions. The issues in Iraq and Afghanistan are modern day examples of how revolutions can not work without a single unifying leader that many citizens can back in any attempt to overthrow and form a new government. In Iraq there was loosely organized resistance against the ruling government. When the Americans invaded to help the resistance there was no person to pull the people to in forming the new government. The resistance ended up with compromise candidates that have only minority support. In Afghanistan there was a promising figure in Ahmad Shah Massoud but he was assassinated before the invasion. The resistance again had to settle for a compromise candidate that was weak in ineffectual. What is happening now in these countries? Confusion and splintering. Without the help of the American government supporting them the leadership of both countries would fall.
4 Responses to “Unifying Leaders in Middle East and Asia”
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So, the big question is … should we continue to prop up these governments that are failing? Is it likely that a unifying figure is going to come along?
I think history shows us that a unifying figure will almost certainly come along. However, I expect the unifying figure won’t be somebody that we as a nation will necessarily like.
I would even argue that in Iraq, a unifying figure has already emerged … Muqtada al Sadr. Of course, we don’t particularly care for him.
One real problem in Iraq is that there is only so much unification that can occur … at the very least, we have the Kurds, the Sunnis, and the Sh’ites. Either a leader from one group will rule at the expense of the others (Saddam Hussein), or the factions must unite. I’m not so sure any amount of American support and aid is going to coerce the Iraqis to unite (at least directly), especially given that by and large they resent our presence there. What will unite them is a common cause. Revolting against the Hussein government would have been such a common cause. If we hang around long enough and continue to breed resentment, then getting rid of the US will be a common cause … one which we, of course, won’t like too much.
I agree to some extent with our hypothesis. The question then becomes how can we leave a situation we started without some form of stable government. Without an answer to that question I don’t think we can leave. I still hold out hope that either a new figure arises that works with the US or that al Sadr can be useful subsitute. In Afghanistan I think the situation is much worse than in Iraq. They have a unifying figure in the Taliban government, Mullah Mohammed Omar. We shall see.
And thus we have a catch-22 situation (at least in my opinion). We can’t leave until we have a stable government. But, I don’t think we’ll get a stable government until we leave, because as long as we’re keeping the peace (more or less … and generally in Iraq it’s less) and really calling the shots, the entity that we have mis-named the “Iraqi Government” will continue to not do much of anything useful.
Of course, you may be right. But I’ve quit being optimistic with people, because I kept getting disappointed.
Oh, and additionally, the article “Why Bush Won’t Leave Iraq” is a pretty good explanation of why I feel like Iraq is a catch-22 situation. It does better at explaining it than I can …